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Abstract: Automatic exchange of information (AEoI) for tax purposes has 
become the global standard for international tax cooperation in 2013. As a tool 
for containing offshore tax evasion, it has encountered opposition in the past and 
continues to be fraught with challenges. This paper recapitulates the rationale for 
AEoI, including estimates on the magnitudes of assets held offshore, with a 
specific focus on Turkish assets held in Germany (chapter 1). Subsequently, 
chapter 2 summarises the recent history and describes the processes and 
milestones until breakthrough for global AEoI in 2013. Chapter 3 then discusses 
three current challenges, including the de facto exclusion of developing 
countries; how to incentivise recalcitrant jurisdictions to participate, such as the 
USA; and issues around the implementation of the CRS, including OECD’s Global 
Forum of Transparency and Exchange of Information, the peer reviews and 
public statistics. Chapter 4 concludes. 
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1. Why Automatic Exchange of Information matters 
Increasing economic inequality and concentration of wealth across the globe is 
becoming widely recognised as a, if not the most important, problem of our time. 
A wide spectrum of actors and organisations, including the World Economic 
Forum in Davos (Vanham, Peter 2017), academics such as Piketty (Piketty 
2014), charities such as Oxfam (Oxfam 2016), the OECD (2015), the 
International Monetary Fund (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015) and the United Nations 
and its Sustainable Development Goals (High Level Panel 2013: 60), have 
pointed out the risks and harms caused by current levels and dynamics in income 
and wealth inequality. These range from degrading the environment, reducing 
economic growth and increasing social exclusion to undermining fair market 
competition and indeed democratic institutions. Societies with lower levels of 
income inequality suffer less from social problems such as crime, mental 
diseases, obesity or teenager pregnancies (Wilkinson/Pickett 2010). This 
suggests that also for the economically better off, more economic equality may 
be desirable as they also stand to benefit from a safer society with less crime 
and other social problems. 
 While there are multiple causes for inequality, one important cause 
consists in the ability of wealthier segments of societies to escape their tax 
obligations. By shifting financial assets and income offshore – that is, across 
borders, beyond the reach of their tax administrations - they can engage in tax 
evasion, which directly undermines both the progressive nature of income 
taxation and thus the bedrock of modern societies, and redistribution as one of 
the four key functions of taxes (Cobham 2007). It also impacts the voluntary 
compliance of all other taxpayers because “[i]f taxpayers believe tax evasion to 
be common, tax morale decreases” (Frey/Torgler 2007: 153). 
Tax havens – or more usefully, financial secrecy jurisdictions – have 
commercialised their sovereignty (Palan 2002) to provide a shield of secrecy for 
those seeking to hide their fortunes. By creating laws that invite financial 
institutions and service providers to receive, hold and manage the assets of non-
residents without providing information to the relevant home authorities, secrecy 
jurisdictions facilitate and incentivise the nondeclaration of assets, income and 
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capital gains.2 But the problem is not restricted anymore to notorious Caribbean 
or Alpine secrecy jurisdictions. Major financial centres such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom and its empire of overseas satellite jurisdictions as well as 
Germany all host substantial offshore assets and provide secrecy (Cobham et al. 
2015; Meinzer 2016).  
Given the widespread principle of worldwide income taxation rights in 
favour of the jurisdiction where individuals are resident, offshoring assets and 
income constitute illegal tax evasion as long as these assets and income are not 
declared in income tax returns to the relevant domestic tax administration. In 
practice, however, the laws underpinning this principle have hardly been 
enforced in practice because the risk of being caught for offshore tax evasion is 
extremely small, absent any third-party reporting obligations that work 
effectively across borders. Without routine reporting by third parties – e.g. by 
financial institutions reporting account balances of clients to the tax 
administrations - compliance with tax laws is likely to fall dramatically. A 
comprehensive study by the US Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service (2012) 
analysed the tax gap for the United States – the differences of taxes due and the 
taxes actually paid. It allocated the amounts lost due to misreporting of income 
into categories of income sorted by the intensity of third party reporting. The 
results are striking: when income is subject to substantial information reporting 
(or high visibility or transparency), only between 1% and 8% of the amounts is 
misreported. However, if the income is subject to little or no information 
reporting (or little or no transparency), 56% of the income is misreported. This 
latter case is, of course, the context of international business and taxation. There 
has not been a functioning system for routine reporting across borders for the 
last decades.  
These findings suggest that tax evasion of cross-border income is the rule, 
and not the exception, at least as long as no effective information reporting on 
that income is taking place. Other studies and experiences confirm this. For 
example, Gaggero (et al. 2007) estimate that 85% of wealth held abroad by 
                                       
2 see Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index for a discussion of the full range of 
issues involved, e.g. www.financialsecrecyindex.com (Cobham et al. 2015; Meinzer 
2016). 
4 
 
Argentineans goes untaxed. A detailed enquiry by the French parliament into the 
leaked data by HSBC private bank corroborated this finding. Of almost 3000 
French clients, only six had properly declared the accounts in their tax return – a 
ratio of ca. 0.2% (Assemblée Nationale 2013: 19-20).  
Important destinations of offshore assets are the United States and 
Switzerland. With respect to Switzerland, Helvea (2009) estimated that between 
80% and 99% of about 2 trillion Swiss Francs invested in Swiss accounts by non-
residents are undeclared. And in Liechtenstein, which is in a customs and 
monetary union with Switzerland, in a sample of accounts held by US clients 
analysed by US Justice, only 2% were declared properly in the USA.3 However, 
the US itself hosts an important offshore asset sector. In a letter to the then 
U.S.-Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner, Florida delegates to the House of 
Representatives wrote in 2011:  
“For more than 90 years, the United States has recognized the importance 
of foreign deposits and has refrained from taxing the interest earned by 
them or requiring their reporting.[…] Because of the privacy laws of the 
United States, nonresident aliens are estimated to have deposited over $3 
trillion in U.S. financial institutions.” (Florida Delegates to the House of 
Representatives 2011: 1). 
While the exact amounts at stake are necessarily uncertain given the hidden 
nature of these activities, there is no doubt that the resulting revenue losses are 
substantial. The lowest estimate of global financial wealth held ‘offshore’ is $7.6 
trillion in 2013 (Zucman 2014), the highest is $21-$32 trillion in 2010 (Henry 
2012). Both studies coincide however that the estimated global tax revenue 
losses resulting from undeclared offshore assets amount to ca. $190bn annually 
– most, if not all of which, would be borne by the wealthiest in each society. This 
amount is greater than the sum of all official development assistance paid to 
developing countries in 2013 (US$ 135 billion).4 For Africa alone, the stock of 
offshore assets that have been accumulated through illegal capital flight between 
                                       
3 Liechtensteiner Vaterland, 19.7.2012, S. 25. 
4 http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-
reach-an-all-time-high.htm; 10.2.2017. 
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1970 and 2008 is estimated to amount to US$944 billion. If contrasted with the 
stock of foreign debt of the same African nations of US$177 billion 
(Ndikumana/Boyce 2011), it becomes apparent that the African continent is a 
net creditor to the rest of the world.  
In the German financial system, the amount of tax exempt interest-
bearing assets held by non-residents ranged between €2.5 - 3 trillion as of 
August 2013. Of this sum, an estimated €7.4 billion of interest bearing 
investments in the German financial system has a direct origin in Turkey, 
including bank deposits, corporate and government debt, as well as interest-
bearing shares of investment funds.5 When applying the same methodology with 
updated data for December 2016, this amount has increased to €10.8 billion (see 
table 1 below). Of the total interest bearing assets held by all non-residents in 
Germany, only ca. 1% was subject to information exchange according to the 
European Savings Tax Directive in 2013 (Meinzer 2015b: 50). Given that interest 
income stemming from those assets would normally be taxable in Turkey6  is 
unlikely to be reported and taxed, the amounts invested in the German financial 
system by Turkish residents imply a considerable revenue loss to Turkey.  
Table 1: Interest bearing assets held in German financial system with 
direct origin in Turkey 
Year/Date Bank 
Liabilities 
only  (Mio. €) 
Of which 
non-bank 
% of 
non-bank 
Multiplier Total interest 
bearing assets 
(Mio. €, 
estimation) 
Aug-13 2,929 1,339 46% 2.534386 7,423    
Sep-15 3,858 2,252 58% see above 9,778    
Dec-16 4,259 2,138 50% see above 10,794    
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank 2013b, 2015, 2017, 2014b, 2013a, 2014a;Meinzer 2015; own analysis. 
                                       
5 Based on Bundesbank data, for methodology see Meinzer 2015: 48-52; 
www.chbeck.de/fachbuch/zusatzinfos/Anhang2_Steueroase%20Deutschland.pdf; 
10.2.2017. 
6 In addition, the assets themselves might be the fruit of domestic tax evasion. 
Therefore, reporting about the income and assets might trigger further investigations 
about domestic tax evasion as well. 
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The findings by the US IRS tax gap study illustrate another important point about 
automatic information exchange. The main effect expected from automatic 
exchange of information (AEoI) is a deterrent effect: it is likely to impact the 
behaviour of offshore investors prior to the information exchanges taking place. 
Therefore, the direct revenue impact of AEoI is hard to measure by the number 
of additional cases or revenue raised through enforcement activity directly 
triggered by AEoI. Rather, investors will adjust their portfolio investment 
decisions and either repatriate assets, relocate or declare them (Meinzer 2010). 
 
2. How did we get here? Past challenges in tax information 
exchange 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008 provided the trigger that accelerated a reform 
process which culminated in the implementation and rolling out of automatic 
information exchange pursuant to the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard 
(CRS). The recent history leading to these events can be categorised in 6 phases 
(see table 2, below).  
Table 2: Phases in the recent history of global tax information exchange  
Period  Phase 
2002-2008  “Upon request” in Sleeping Beauty 
2009-2010  Rolling out of “upon request”, brewing conflict around AEoI 
2010-2012  Conflict: enter FATCA and Rubik 
2012-2013  Breakthrough for AEoI 
2013-2014  Details of open AEoI framework are unveiled, the battle for scope 
2015-?:  Rolling out, the battle for meta transparency and effective sanctions 
 
The first phase begun with the demise of the OECD’s harmful tax competition 
(1998) project, which was effectively blocked by tax havens and their political 
allies. As a result, the OECD invited six notorious tax havens which had 
committed to improve on transparency to participate in shaping a standard for 
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information exchange and transparency. The initial six were Bermuda, Cayman 
Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius and San Marino. Soon, this group became the 
Global Forum Working Group on Effective Exchange of Information, and 
expanded its membership to include, in addition to OECD and the 
aforementioned, the following jurisdictions: Aruba, Bahrain, Isle of Man, the 
Netherlands Antilles, and the Seychelles (OECD 2002: 2). This group developed 
the 2002 Model agreement for tax information exchange (TIEA), which was 
restricted to information exchange upon request (ibid.; Meinzer et al. 2009). 
However, very few TIEAs were signed by notorious tax havens until the global 
financial crisis hit in 2008 (Misereor 2010: 3).  
While automatic information exchange was hardly being discussed at the 
OECD at that time, public discourse and other organisations went further. In 
2003, the European Union (EU) enacted the first multilateral system for 
automatic information exchange through its Savings Tax Directive (Gilligan 
2003). While limited in scope and riddled with exceptions and loopholes, it 
established an important precedent for the principle of automatically exchanging 
sensitive bank information across borders. In April 2008, some commentators 
wrote in the Financial Times: “We need the automatic exchange of tax 
information between jurisdictions and all developing countries must be 
included”.7 This call was echoed later by Mexico’s Finance Minister Agustin 
Carstens who said in a letter to U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy 
Geithner: "The [automatic] exchange of information on interest paid by banks 
will certainly provide us with a powerful tool to detect, prevent and combat tax 
evasion, money laundering, terrorist financing, drug trafficking and organized 
crime.“ (Carstens 2009; [own addition]).  
In 2008, a series of public media stories increased the pressure for 
fundamental reform. The United States Justice Department was investigating 
UBS through the insights offered by whistleblower Bradley Birkenfeld, causing 
media headlines and a Senate Probe throughout 2008.8 In February 2008, 
German tax investigators raided the home of the then CEO of Deutsche Post AG 
                                       
7 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/63cdb642-ea03-11dc-b3c9-
0000779fd2ac.html?siteedition=intl; 3.10.2014. 
8 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121624391105859731; 13.2.2017. 
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because of his tax evasion through a Liechtenstein account. This event marked 
the (recent) beginning of data purchases by German tax administrations from 
whistleblowers mainly of Swiss banks. This exerted considerable and ongoing 
pressure on Swiss banking secrecy. A veritable hole was blown into Swiss 
banking secrecy in February 2009 by the settlement of Swiss Bank UBS with the 
US Justice Department by agreeing to pay US$ 780 million and handing over 
client data of many thousands US account holders.9  
Only after the OECD published a list of non-cooperating jurisdictions in 
April 2009 (black-grey-white-list) in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a 
race to sign TIEAs ensued (2nd phase; Misereor 2010). Through the requirement 
to sign 12 TIEAs in order to be removed from the grey list, the OECD placed 
emphasis on rolling out the upon request information exchange system,  labelled 
“internationally agreed tax standard”. In November 2009 at the Global Forum 
meeting in Mexico, the OECD decided to open Global Forum’s membership whilst 
effectively preserving OECD’s influence over the Global Forum, and to undertake 
peer reviews of jurisdiction’s compliance with information exchange upon request 
(Meinzer 2012b: 7-8). Yet despite mounting criticisms of the insufficiency of the 
upon request system (Sheppard 2009; Meinzer et al. 2009), the OECD hardened 
its stance and defended its opposition against automatic information exchange. 
OECD’s public affairs director, wrote in a public letter to the Financial Times on 
30 April 2009: "The OECD’s high standards on transparency and exchange of 
information address issues raised on the use of trusts, bearer shares and other 
opaque structures. While they enjoy universal endorsement, the challenge now 
lies in their swift and effective implementation. […] Influential non-governmental 
organisations [...] can help developing countries most by pressuring for delivery, 
rather than risking an unravelling of what has been achieved through calls to 
reopen debates”10. 
The third phase of intense political fighting over automatic information 
exchange began when the Swiss Banker Association published their proposal for 
                                       
9 http://europe.newsweek.com/how-far-switzerlands-biggest-bank-did-us-tax-evasion-
scam-reach-280154?rm=eu; http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/business/ubss-track-
record-of-averting-prosecution-common-sense.html; 13.2.2017. 
10 http://taxjustice.blogspot.de/2009/05/illicit-flows-oecds-swaggering-stance.html; 
3.10.2014. 
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an anonymous “flat rate tax on assets held with banks on a cross-border basis” 
in December 2009. This proposal – known as the “Rubik”-deals - subsequently 
became the official Swiss tax policy position as an alternative to automatic 
information exchange. The project outline was explicit about its purpose: "The 
flat rate tax means: [...] The issue of automatic exchange of information thus 
becomes obsolete" (Swiss Bankers Association 2009: 4). Over the next years, 
Switzerland intensely sought to enter into those bilateral deals to preserve 
anonymity and secrecy of Swiss banking assets (Tax Justice Network 2011). 
Negotiations with the UK and Austria were successful11, and also Germany’s 
government signed a treaty with Switzerland in April 201212.  
Meanwhile, the United States enacted in March 2010 the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), which over the next years required financial 
institutions across the globe to automatically report detailed information about 
any US-related financial account to the IRS. This law created an unprecedented 
revolution in offshore banking because of the detail of the information to be 
reported, the global scope and the leverage exerted over banks by threatening 
non-compliant banking groups with a hefty 30% withholding tax on all US source 
payments. However, FATCA did not entail the principle of reciprocity and 
therefore allowed the US to continue providing de facto banking secrecy to non-
residents investing in the US financial system.13 In November 2011, it was 
India’s prime minister Manmohan Singh who took the torch of frontrunner by 
openly calling for the G20 to embrace automatic information exchange: "The G20 
countries should take the lead in agreeing to automatic exchange of tax related 
information with each other, irrespective of artificial distinctions such as past or 
present, for tax evasion or tax fraud, in the spirit of our London Summit that 'the 
era of bank secrecy is over'“14. Itai Grinberg, professor of Law at Georgetown 
University, in January 2012, published a paper in which he asserted: “The 
international tax system is in the midst of a novel contest between information 
reporting and anonymous withholding models for ensuring that states have the 
                                       
11 http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=UK-Swiss-Tax-Agreement; 14.2.2017. 
12 http://www.bbc.com/news/business-17624364; 14.2.2017. 
13 http://taxjustice.blogspot.de/2010/05/fatca-new-automatic-info-exchange-tool.html; 
14.2.2017. 
14 http://taxjustice.blogspot.de/2011/11/india-demands-automatic-information.html; 
14.2.2017. 
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ability to tax offshore accounts.” (Grinberg 2012: 2). Furthermore, through 2011 
and 2012, the OECD’s system for information exchange upon request and the 
associated peer review process came under increasing attack, as is revealed by 
heated disputes in International Tax Review.15 At the same time, the signed 
Rubik agreement between Switzerland and Germany met resistance not least 
through a broad based campaign against the ratification of the agreement.16  
 Breakthrough (phase 4) came when opposition parties in the upper 
chamber of the German parliament (Bundesrat) on 23 November 2012 rejected 
the Rubik agreements.17 The path for automatic information exchange was 
cleared as the Swiss strategy to claim equivalence of Rubik agreements and to 
divide the EU and the OECD had failed. Up to that point, TIEAs and associated 
peer reviews remained the only pillar of OECD’s work to counter tax havens and 
offshore tax evasion for more than a decade. The first visible sign of the 
changing tide consisted in the G20 Communiqué issued on 19 April 2013, when 
the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors stated: “We welcome progress 
made towards automatic exchange of information which is expected to be the 
standard and urge all jurisdictions to move towards exchanging information 
automatically with their treaty partners, as appropriate.” (G20 2013). Less than 
a month later, 17 EU members issued a statement for the creation of a pilot 
multilateral automatic exchange facility: "Automatic information exchange 
between tax authorities is a powerful tool in tackling and deterring tax evasion. 
[...] we strongly support the development of a single global standard for 
                                       
15 http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3018232/Battle-lines-drawn-between-
OECD-and-Tax-Justice-Network.html; 
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/2994829/EXCLUSIVE-Why-tax-justice-
campaigners-and-the-OECD-are-not-seeing-eye-to-eye.html; 
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3024581/Why-the-OECD-must-improve-
the-model-for-information-exchange.html; http://taxjustice.blogspot.de/2011/11/oecd-
should-step-aside-and-let-un.html; http://taxjustice.blogspot.de/2012/02/2012-tax-and-
transparency-forum-london.html; http://taxjustice.blogspot.de/2012/11/uk-government-
to-wield-big-stick-on.html; http://taxjustice.blogspot.de/2012/05/raising-global-profile-
of-tax-justice.html;  http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3012873/Guatemala-
Archive/TJN-and-ICC-demand-improvements-to-peer-review-process.html;  
16 http://steuergerechtigkeit.blogspot.de/2012/11/bundnis-begrut-nein-des-bundesrates-
zum_23.html; 17.2.2017. 
17 http://www.reuters.com/article/germany-switzerland-tax-idUSB4E8LM00H20121123; 
14.2.2017. 
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automatic exchange of information covering a wide scope of income and 
entities".18  
The OECD quickly changed tack and by the G8 summit in Lough Erne in 
June 2013 it had prepared a 20-page outline for a multilateral system of 
automatic tax information modelled on FATCA (OECD 2013), yet omitting 
FATCA’s crucial leverage of a withholding tax. Less than a year later, on 13th  
February 2014, the OECD published the first version of the Common Reporting 
Standard (OECD 2014b). Intense lobbying by the Swiss Bankers Association and 
the Swiss government successfully restricted the information exchange on the 
condition of reciprocity and specific uses of the data solely for tax purposes 
(preventing data being used for money laundering or corruption investigations).19 
Criticism by civil society and others about the tolerance of bilateralism and the 
refusal to waive reciprocal requirements for developing countries (Tax Justice 
Network 2014) was countered by OECD’s Pascal Saint-Amans, head of OECD’s 
tax department: “The specific needs of developing countries should not be 
addressed by lowering standards for them, but rather by helping them to meet 
the standards […]. The Global Forum will look into the particular concerns of 
developing countries which have a right to benefit from transparency”.20 
Furthermore, he asserted in May 2014: “Most (developing countries) are not yet 
ready and most of them don’t want it”.21  
Shortly after, in June 2014, TJN published a report which surveyed 
developing country tax administrations and finance ministries, finding that 
“Developing countries want automatic information exchange” 22 (Knobel/Meinzer 
                                       
18 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-on-the-pilot-multilateral-
automatic-information-exchange-facility; 14.2.2017. 
19 To realise how absurd the hard condition of reciprocity is, consider how likely it is that 
rich Nigerians stash their money in Switzerland, and how unlikely it is that any Swiss tax 
evaders will choose Nigeria to stash theirs. See: 
http://www.swissbanking.org/en/topics/current-issues/the-automatic-exchange-of-
information; 14.2.2017. 
20 http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3319275/EXCLUSIVE-Pascal-Saint-
Amans-defends-OECDs-Common-Reporting-Standard-despite-loopholes-identified-
by.html?edit=true; 14.2.2017. 
21 http://news.trust.org//item/20140526065643-2fhq7/; 14.2.2017. 
22 http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3354926/Corporate-Tax/Developing-
countries-want-automatic-information-exchange-Tax-Justice-Network-reveals.html; 
14.2.2017. 
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2014a). The survey found out that the OECD did only consult with developing 
countries after the major decisions were made, and failed to ask about 
preferences of developing countries beyond capacity building. The preferences of 
the surveyed developing countries consistently deviated from the OECD model in 
the preference of a truly, binding multilateral agreement, the waiving of 
reciprocity requirements for developing countries, sanctions for non-compliant 
financial institutions (similar to FATCA), and for the inclusion of other types of 
assets, such as real estate (ibid.). 
The rolling out of the standard proceeded, ignoring these interests of 
developing countries. On July 21st, 2014, the OECD published its full version of 
the Standard, including Commentaries23 (OECD 2014c; Knobel/Meinzer 2014b); 
in August 2014 a “roadmap for developing country participation” (Global Forum 
2014); in October 2014, the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) 
to implement the CRS (OECD 2014a; then signed by 51 jurisdictions24); and in 
August 2015, a handbook for the implementation of the CRS (OECD 2015b; 
Knobel 2015).  
Meanwhile, the European deadlock for progress on automatic information 
exchange was overcome when in March 2014 Luxembourg and Austria lifted their 
longstanding veto for amending the EU-Savings Tax Directive.25 In the end, the 
European Union moved to implement the CRS through an amendment to its 
directive on administrative assistance in December 2014 (Council of the 
European Union 2014) and repealed the EU-Savings Tax Directive26. The CRS 
now was established as the new international standard for automatic information 
exchange.  
3. Current Challenges 
As of January 2017, more than 100 jurisdictions have committed to join the CRS27 
and more than 85 jurisdictions have signed the Multilateral Competent Authority 
                                       
23 http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-delivers-new-single-global-standard-on-
automatic-exchange-of-information.htm; 14.2.2017. 
24 http://www.reuters.com/article/global-tax-idUSL5N0SO44J20141029; 14.2.2017. 
25 https://www.ft.com/content/018d3a86-b0f2-11e3-9f6f-00144feab7de; 3.10.2014. 
26 http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/individuals/personal-taxation/taxation-savings-
income/repeal-savings-directive-line-with-international-eu-developments_en; 14.2.2017. 
27 https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf; 30.1.2017. 
13 
 
Agreement (MCAA)28 to implement the CRS. The first exchanges under the CRS 
are taking place in 2017 and 2018.  
In the European Union, the Directive (2014/107/EU amending Directive 
2011/16/EU) that is binding on member states for translating the CRS into 
domestic law requires first information exchanges in 2017 with the exception of 
Austria, which will begin exchanging in 2018 (Council of the European Union 2014). 
The European Union has negotiated similar agreements with five European, yet 
not EU-member states, namely with Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino and 
Switzerland, and initialled the last of these agreements with Monaco on 22 
February 2016, with exchanges beginning in 2018.29 The information exchange 
among 28 EU members and these 5 territories will be governed by the EU-directive 
and these agreements, respectively. 
The EU-Directive is not entirely identical to the CRS. Notably, less stringent 
reporting requirements for some trusts30 are available in the CRS, but this is not 
allowed in the EU-Directive (Council of the European Union 2014: 20).  
In Germany, the law implementing automatic information exchange pursuant to 
the respective Directive has been discussed in parliament during a public expert 
hearing on 2 November 2015 (Meinzer 2015a; Henn 2015) and was enacted on 
21 December 2015 (Bundestag/Bundesrat 2015).  
3.1 De facto exclusion of developing countries 
The two major obstacles developing countries face when seeking to access 
information about their residents’ offshore assets consist in the requirement of 
full reciprocal information exchange, and in the option for a “dating system”. The 
latter allows major financial centres to engage in cherry picking, as they have 
announced to do. While the first problem could be overcome through capacity 
                                       
28 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/MCAA-Signatories.pdf; 
30.1.2017. 
29 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-381_en.htm; 14.2.2017. 
30 The CRS allows a country to treat trusts that are Passive Non-Financial Entities (NFEs) 
as if they were “reporting-Financial Institution trusts”. While the former would have to 
report all beneficiaries, including discretionary beneficiaries, the latter is allowed not to 
report discretionary beneficiaries until they receive a distribution (OECD 2015b: 17). In 
jurisdictions that are applying that option, discretionary beneficiaries will be reported only 
after receiving a distribution. Given that a “distribution” may be hidden as a loan (or 
other type of payment never to be repaid), the EU-Commission ruled out that option. 
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building, including through pilot projects (Knobel 2017a), the other problem 
continues to act as an effective barrier to prevent developing countries from 
accessing urgently needed data about their tax residents. 
In addition to the domestic legislation, the international legal framework that 
jurisdictions need for participating in the CRS consists of two elements. First, an 
international framework treaty or convention, and second, a competent authority 
agreement (CAA) with the specific jurisdiction in question and with a specific 
reference to the CRS. A combination of bilateral and multilateral approaches are 
possible.  
Table 3: Combinations of Bi- and Multilateralism for Participating in the 
CRS 
 International Legal 
Framework Instrument 
Competent Authority 
Agreement 
Bilateral (1) DTA or TIEA (2) Bilateral CAA 
Multilateral (3) Multilateral Convention (4) Multilateral CAA (MCAA) 
Source: adapted from Knobel/Meinzer (forthcoming).  
The bilateral international legal framework for AEoI rests either on Art. 26 of the 
UN and OECD Model Double Tax Agreements (DTAs) or on Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) that explicitly allow AEoI. The multilateral approach 
involves being a party (not merely signing but also ratifying) to the Amended31 
OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters32 
(the Multilateral Convention). As for the competent authority agreement, the OECD 
originally published in February of 2014 a model bilateral CAA. In July of 2014, a 
model multilateral CAA was also published. In October of 2016, however, 
jurisdictions signed an amended33 Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement 
(MCAA).  
                                       
31 For example, the U.S. is only party to the original Multilateral Convention which was not 
open to non-OECD countries (the 2010 amending Protocol opened the Convention to non-
OECD countries). Therefore, the U.S. cannot be said to have an agreement with non-OECD 
countries that are party only to the Amended Convention. 
32 TJN has analysed this convention in greater detail elsewhere (Meinzer 2012a). 
33 The main difference between the original model MCAA and the amended (model) MCAA 
that was finally signed by countries relates to the way to join (sign) the MCAA. The 
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An example of a major secrecy jurisdiction combining the Multilateral Convention 
with bilateral CAAs (3 and 2 in table 3, above) is Singapore.34 The Bahamas have 
opted to combine only bilateral treaties with bilateral CAAs (1 and 2 in table 3, 
above) – the only path which has attracted open criticism by the OECD so far.35  
Yet even the ideal multilateral scenario (combining 3 and 4 in table 3, above) 
does not require participating jurisdictions to engage in AEoI with all other co-
signatories. The MCAA’s Annex E allows jurisdictions to choose with whom they 
want to engage in AEoI. Like in a dating portal, AEoI will only take place among 
jurisdictions that chose each other (that were matched together). The OECD 
published a list of “activated” AEOI relationships.36 However, it does not publicly 
reveal the full list of choices of each jurisdiction. Therefore, it is difficult to 
establish whether “inactive” relationships are a result of a mutual lack of interest 
or whether one country chose another one but it was not chosen back.  
This puts developing countries at a disadvantage, as they are unlikely to be 
priorities for major financial centres. Switzerland is an example of a major 
secrecy jurisdiction (it was ranked at No. 1 in the 2015 Financial Secrecy 
Index37) that chose the “best multilateral” option (3 and 4 in table 3, see above), 
but which as early as 2014 has announced openly that it will only engage in AEoI 
with jurisdictions “with which there are close economic and political ties and 
which, if appropriate, provide their taxpayers with sufficient scope for 
regularisation and which are considered to be important and promising in terms 
of their market potential for Switzerland's finance industry”.38 These 
                                       
original model required existing signatories to approve by consensus before any new 
country could join (sign) the MCAA, assuming that all co-signatories (including new ones) 
would exchange information with each other. Instead, the amended MCAA is open to any 
country, but adds the “dating system” which allows each country to pick with whom to 
engage in AEOI, instead of requiring exchanges with all other signatories. 
34 https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/News-and-Events/Newsroom/Media-Releases-and-
Speeches/Media-Releases/2016/Singapore-and-Australia-to-Share-Data-to-Reduce-Tax-
Evasion/; 30.1.2017. 
35 http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2016/09/24/57e56aa9468aeb67188b4631.html; 
http://www.taxjustice.net/2016/09/08/bahamas-tax-haven-emerging-global-menace/; 
30.1.2017. 
36 http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-
crs/exchange-relationships/; 30.1.2017. 
37 www.financialsecrecyindex.net; 14.2.2017. 
38 http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=53050; 9.1.2014. 
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considerations still reflect the official Swiss negotiation position in 2015/2016.39  
Furthermore, Switzerland requires for some countries additional bilateral 
agreements or declarations before considering those for inclusion in Annex E.40  
While the MCAA requires no justification when not choosing another signatory 
jurisdiction for AEoI, the Global Forum Annual report (2016: 24) suggests that 
countries should exchange information with all other countries interested in 
receiving information, as long as confidentiality and safeguards for protection of 
personal data are in place41. However, data protection concerns can be easily 
abused for denying information exchange to developing countries. Although the 
Global Forum has conducted confidentiality assessments of each jurisdiction willing 
to engage in AEoI, the MCAA’s Annex C allows jurisdictions to impose extra 
safeguards for the protection of personal data. Switzerland’s focus on consultations 
on protection of data42 suggests that Annex C could be used for additional 
exclusions.  
These various options for major secrecy jurisdictions to delay automatic 
information exchange with developing countries, combined with the insistence on 
reciprocity and the exclusion of developing countries during the design stages of 
the CRS, risks exacerbating, rather than moderating, the tax information 
asymmetries between OECD and developing countries. The OECD system 
condones secrecy jurisdictions forcing developing countries to spend very scarce 
                                       
39 
https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/dokumentation/00153/01353/01388/index.html?lang=en; 
14.2.2017. 
40 For an overview of the jurisdictions with whom Switzerland has entered into AEOI, see 
those jurisdictions with a date in column 2: 
https://www.sif.admin.ch/sif/en/home/themen/internationale-
steuerpolitik/automatischer-informationsaustausch.html ; for an example of an extra 
agreement with Argentina, see:  
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-64554.html; 
for a description of the additional declarations, see: 
http://blogs.pwc.de/citt/2016/11/29/switzerland-signs-bilateral-agreement-five-
countries-automatic-exchange-information-tax-matters/; 21.2.2017. 
41 Global Forum 2016, p. 24: “A process is being developed to ensure transparency in 
relation to whether 
jurisdictions have a network of exchange relationships covering all partners interested in 
receiving data from it”. 
42 
https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/dokumentation/00153/01353/01388/index.html?lang=en; 
30.1.2017, 
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resources and extra time for negotiating and signing bilateral treaties, thus 
supporting an at least transitional de facto exclusion. Furthermore, the OECD 
remained silent between 2014-2016 when secrecy jurisdictions such as 
Switzerland openly imposed the above-mentioned arbitrary conditions which 
directly impinge on other jurisdiction’s sovereign rights to tax their residents’ 
income. Similarly, the OECD has failed to openly discuss the USA’s failure to 
engage in the CRS, and to explore ways of bringing the USA into the CRS.  
3.2 How to incentivise recalcitrant jurisdictions to participate 
In difference to the US FATCA law, the CRS does not contain any built in 
provision to incentivise financial institutions and/or jurisdictions to participate, 
such as a 30% withholding tax for US source payments FATCA is imposing on 
financial institutions that do not provide data under FATCA. As a result, initially, a 
number of jurisdictions did not commit to the CRS, such as Bahrain, Lebanon and 
Panama. In the meantime, however, all major secrecy jurisdictions have 
committed to the CRS standard except for the United States. In an OECD 
document listing all commitments, the only footnote states: 
“The United States has indicated that it is undertaking automatic information 
exchanges pursuant to FATCA from 2015 and has entered into intergovernmental 
agreements (IGAs) with other jurisdictions to do so. The Model 1A IGAs entered 
into by the United States acknowledge the need for the United States to achieve 
equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information exchange with partner 
jurisdictions. They also include a political commitment to pursue the adoption of 
regulations and to advocate and support relevant legislation to achieve such 
equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic exchange.”43 
The IGA type 1A, which does contain some reciprocity and the political 
commitment to achieve full reciprocity, is the type of IGA signed by Germany 
and Turkey to implement AEoI pursuant to FATCA with the USA. The 
asymmetries in the levels of information exchanges are notable (see table 4, 
below).44  
                                       
43 https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf; 15.2.2017. 
44 For a detailed version of this table, see: http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/FATCAdifference-between-US-and-Germany.pdf; 15.2.2017. 
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Table 4: Specific asymmetries in reporting obligations under FATCA IGA 
1A (Germany-USA) 
  Category 
German Banks' 
reporting obligations (
about US persons)      
US Banks' reporting obligations (about 
German residents) 
Type of Account 
All financial accounts 
(art. 1,1,dd) 
(i)  Depositary accounts only if held 
by individuals (art. 1,1,cc); 
(ii) Other financial accounts only if covered 
by existing reporting rules under chapter 3 or 
61 of subtitle A of US Internal Revenue Code 
(art. 1.1.cc) – see below “Type of 
Information”.  
Look-through of 
entity account 
holders to identify 
controlling persons 
Yes: identify controlling 
person of passive NFE 
and of Non-US 
entities (Art. 1,1,dd; Art 
2,2,a),1; and Annex I, 
IV, C) 
No. No reference to German controlling 
persons (neither of passive NFEs nor of Non-
German entities) 
Type of Information "All" (art 2,2,a) 
"All" except for account balance, gross 
proceeds from sale or redemption of property 
and controlling persons' identity; and for 
non-depository financial accounts, any 
information only to the extent it is reported 
under form 1042. That includes U.S.-sourced 
rents, royalties, interests on U.S. 
government bonds or corporate bonds and –
among other - insurance premiums. 
However, it excludes capital gains on all 
those categories.45 
Source: Analysis by TJN, based on FATCA IGA 1A between Germany and USA 
(United States of America/Federal Republic of Germany 2013).46  
                                       
 
45 https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1042s/ch01.html#d0e790; 17.2.2017.  
46 For a more comprehensive analysis of the differences, see Knobel 2016: 13-14. 
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Despite the US commitment present in IGAs 1A (Article 6) to achieve full 
reciprocity, however, there is no timeframe and U.S. Congress has to approve 
the changes to achieve full reciprocity, as evidenced in a letter sent by the US 
Secretary of the Treasury to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on 5 
May 2016 (Lew 2016; Knobel 2016: 11). Furthermore, the USA has only signed, 
but not ratified the Amended Tax Convention.47  
 The failure of the USA to participate in a level playing field for taxing 
offshore accounts has become the subject of media reporting and debate.48 In 
order to incentivise US financial institutions and the US government to 
participate, and to increase the benefits for developing countries flowing from 
AEoI, Tax Justice Network (2016) has published a proposal in January 2016. It 
calls on the European Union to introduce a 30% withholding tax on all EU-
sourced payments to any financial institution based in a financial centre that is 
not sharing sufficient information with the EU, or with any “fit and ready” 
developing country. This proposal has been presented to the EU-Commission 
Expert Group on automatic exchange of financial account information on 6 
November 2016.49 Table 5 (below) summarises the key features. 
 
 
 
                                       
47 www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf; 15.2.2017. 
The USA has only ratified and is only party to the original Multilateral Tax Convention 
which was not open to non-OECD countries. An amending Protocol in 2010 opened the 
Convention to non-OECD countries (Meinzer 2012a). Therefore, the USA does not have 
an agreement with non-OECD countries that are party only to the Amended Convention 
without a separate treaty with the US. 
48 For instance, the Economist on 20 February 2016, 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21693219-having-launched-and-led-
battle-against-offshore-tax-evasion-america-now-part; 15.2.2017. 
49 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&i
d=29724&no=7; 15.2.2017. 
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Table 5: Options for a 30% withholding tax on EU-sourced payments to 
financial institutions which do not send full reciprocal information to all 
EU member states and developing countries 
Scenario Condition for 
EU WHT:  
not sharing 
enough  
information 
with . . . 
Direct target for WHT Implementation 
1. Ideal EU and any ‘fit’ 
developing 
country.  
Financial institutions 
located in any recalcitrant 
financial centre. Option to 
target also financial 
institutions located in a 
non-financial centre that 
has signed a FATCA IGA 
Unilateral (e.g. 
Directive) for all. 
1b. Ideal, 
but softly-
softly on 
US 
As above. As above. Unilateral (e.g. 
Directive), except for 
the U.S., where IGAs 
are renegotiated. 
2. EU self-
interest 
EU first (with 
‘fit’ developing 
countries later)  
As above. As any of the above. 
3. US-EU 
initial 
focus 
EU first (with 
‘fit’ developing 
countries later) 
U.S. financial institutions, 
until the U.S. provides CRS-
equivalent levels of 
information exchange. 
As any of the above. 
Source: Tax Justice Network 2016.  
 
3.3 Implementation of the CRS – The Global Forum, Peer Reviews and 
Public Statistics 
Setting aside the various omissions and loopholes present in the CRS 
(Knobel/Meinzer 2014b), the Implementation Handbook (Knobel 2015) and the 
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MCAA50, ensuring compliance with the existing CRS poses serious challenges. 
Financial institutions, High Net Worth Individuals and their legal and accounting 
service providers have strong incentives to develop new avoidance techniques 
(mainly hide behind opaque structures such as companies or trusts that will avoid 
reporting or at least be exempt from identifying their beneficial owners depending 
on their account balances and the entity’s income structure respectively),  and the 
administrations of many secrecy jurisdictions are unlikely to strictly enforce laws 
which they may have only grudgingly accepted to abide by in response to 
international pressure.  
Public registries of the beneficial owners of companies and trusts are an 
indispensable part to ensure compliance with the CRS, either to cross-check 
information that has to be collected by financial institutions or to provide 
information that will otherwise remain unknown (when financial institutions do not 
need to collect this beneficial ownership information). The CRS requires financial 
institutions to identify and collect information on the beneficial owners (called 
“controlling persons”) only when the account holder is an entity considered a 
passive non-financial entity (NFE) because most of its income is passive (e.g. 
interests, dividends, etc.). When such entity is a company, the CRS relies on the 
definition of beneficial ownership as provided for by the existing anti-money 
laundering standard of the FATF (Financial Action Task Force 2012), with all its 
limitations (thresholds of the FATF for defining beneficial ownership are high and 
they tolerate senior managers to be recorded as beneficial owners in specific 
circumstances).  
In the case of trusts, the CRS definitions go beyond FATF definitions and are 
more comprehensive. Nevertheless, because there are hardly any registers of 
trusts anywhere (Knobel/Meinzer 2016b) and very few beneficial ownership 
registries for companies (e.g. the UK), it is impossible for financial institutions to 
cross-check for accuracy and truthfulness, the information they collect on 
beneficial owners. As regards "entity" account holders that are not considered 
"passive" but "active" (because their income is mostly stemming from business 
                                       
50 http://www.taxjustice.net/2016/10/25/oecd-information-exchange-dating-game/; 
30.1.2017. 
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activities such as providing goods or services), financial institutions do not have to 
collect any beneficial ownership information at all pursuant to the CRS. Without 
public beneficial ownership registries, it is very difficult to ascertain who the 
individuals behind those active entities are. In other words, public registries of 
beneficial owners are a necessary complement in order for the CRS to ensure 
effective reporting about those high risk structures (Knobel/Meinzer 2016a, 
2016b;Knobel 2017b). 
The low level of sanctions (e.g. fines) in case even of wilful non-
compliance with the due diligence and reporting obligations by staff of financial 
institutions is another reason why the implementation of the CRS is at peril. For 
example, in Germany, the maximum sanction even for wilful misreporting has 
been increased after a public hearing in the Bundestag from initially 5000€ to 
50.000€ (§28, in: Bundestag/Bundesrat 2015; Meinzer 2015a; Henn 2015); in 
Switzerland, the maximum fine for wilful non-compliance is CHF 250.000 (Art. 
32, in: Bundesversammlung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 2015); in 
Austria, 200.000€ (§107, in: Nationalrat Österreich 2015). Only the Netherlands 
has implemented a prison sentence of up to four years in case of intentional non-
reporting in addition to monetary fines (Art. 69, General Law on State Taxes51; 
Art. 11, Law on international assistance in the field of taxation52).  
Without prison sentences, and with fines that are capped at absolute 
monetary amounts, any client manager of financial institutions can offer non-
compliance as a commercial service by easily calculating the maximum cost if 
s/he is caught for non-compliance, and offer that service to selected high net 
worth clients with whom the terms for reimbursement of the fines in case of 
detection would need to be agreed contractually.  
Beginning in 2019, OECD’s Global Forum of Transparency and Exchange of 
Information (the Global Forum) will undertake comprehensive peer reviews to 
assess compliance with the CRS. In 2015 and 2016, the Global Forum has 
conducted first-stage basic assessments on the domestic legal framework and the 
confidentiality provisions of jurisdictions participating in the CRS. However, neither 
                                       
51 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002320/2016-05-01#HoofdstukIX_Afdeling1_Artikel69; 20.2.2017. 
52 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003954/2017-01-01#HoofdstukII_Afdeling4b_Artikel11; 20.2.2017. 
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the details, nor results nor the terms of reference (ToR) of those basic reviews 
were published, which casts doubt on OECD’s and Global Forum’s suitability to lead 
the transition towards a more transparent international tax order in the 21st 
century. 
While the ToR for the full peer reviews have not yet been published, work 
around the ToR has reportedly53 started. Already in 2000-2002, the OECD had 
invited notorious secrecy jurisdictions to join the drafting table of the “upon 
request” information exchange standard. Figure 1 (below) shows the composition 
of the group responsible for drafting the current ToR. As is easily discernible, again 
notorious secrecy jurisdictions – together with the major Anglo-Saxon financial 
centres - continue to play a disproportional role in the organisation of the peer 
review processes.  
Figure 1: Composition of the Peer Review Group of the Global Forum as of 
January 2017 
 
Source: OECD website.54  
                                       
53 Telephone communication with OECD on 17.1.2017. 
54 http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/peerreviewgroup.htm; 
6.2.2017. 
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In the face of the risk for the new ToR to harbour considerable secrecy, and 
in the light of past failures in earlier peer review processes to provide the data 
needed for objective and independent evaluations (Meinzer 2012b: 20), Tax 
Justice Network has published a report with crucial issues that should be addressed 
by the future peer reviews for AEoI in order for them to objectively assess and 
document the CRS’ effectiveness (Knobel/Meinzer forthcoming).  
Many of the earlier analyses into the multiple loopholes suggest that detailed, 
public statistics by each jurisdiction are an indispensable part of any meaningful 
peer review of the implementation of the CRS. Jurisdictions that fail to annually 
provide comprehensive, comparable, detailed and robust statistics about the 
implementation of the CRS should automatically be treated as non-participating 
jurisdictions.  
The only way to ensure the enforcement of the CRS is to have robust public 
statistics on the number and value of accounts that are being reported, and 
especially those which are excluded from reporting. By doing this, and comparing 
across jurisdictions, it will be possible to track compliance throughout the years, 
but also identify and alert on avoidance mechanisms, for example if there is an 
increase in values held by non-reporting financial institutions or by non-reportable 
accounts or non-reportable persons. Australia has already moved to require 
statistics about the CRS to be published.55 
Detailed public aggregate statistics on the performance of the CRS are essential 
also for a number of other reasons. First and foremost, as recent revelations in to 
the scale of cross-border tax abuse like Offshore Leaks, Swiss Leaks and Panama 
Papers have shown, it is vital to rebuild the public confidence and trust in the rule 
of law. This entails data showing the degree of compliant reporting by financial 
institutions and of impartial, efficient processing of data and following up on cases 
by the tax administration and public prosecutor. Researchers, civil society and 
journalists need comprehensive and robust public data to track reporting and 
enforcement over time. Without such public accountability, trust in the functioning 
of international institutions and the rule of law will continue to erode.  
                                       
55 http://www.taxjustice.net/2016/02/24/15031/; 15.2.2017. 
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For robust and relevant statistics, it is essential for a jurisdiction to choose the 
wider-wider approach (financial institutions collect and report information on all 
non-residents, and not only those, whose country of residence is participating in 
the CRS) and requiring nil returns with information on the values held by exempt 
reporting FIs, accounts or persons. A detailed proposal for the organisation of the 
statistics without creating additional costs for financial institutions, and for how to 
use the statistics for compliance analysis, is available (Knobel/Meinzer 
forthcoming). 
4. Conclusions 
The advent of the Common Reporting Standard is a welcome and major 
breakthrough in the global fight against illicit financial flows and offshore tax 
evasion. Both exacerbate inequalities within and across nations and threaten the 
social fabric and the rule of law underpinning democratic societies and fair 
market competition. However, the CRS does not spell the end of offshore tax 
evasion and its lasting and transformative impact hinges upon a number of 
crucial, unresolved issues.  
First, the effective bilateralism through voluntary choices of exchange partners 
under the guise of multilateralism run the risk of extending and shifting the 
problem of offshore tax evasion from OECD and G20 members to less powerful 
emerging economies and developing countries. The Global Forum peer reviews 
have the potential to address this issue by insisting on swiftly entering into CAAs 
with any interested parties, as long as basic confidentiality and human rights 
conditions are met. 
Second, the USA’s refusal to engage in CRS and its very limited reciprocity 
embedded in FATCA agreement IGA 1A risks undermining the global level playing 
field and needs urgently to be remedied. The European Union holds the key to 
bring the USA back into the international community by using its internal 
financial market and currency as a leverage to incentivise the USA to fully 
reciprocate and participate in the CRS.  
Third, without public registries about the beneficial owners of companies, trusts 
and foundations, the reporting about the riskiest category of accounts – those 
held by passive NFEs – is unlikely to be effective. As the UK has shown, it is 
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possible to advance unilaterally on that matter, and the EU is close to agreeing 
such mandatory central and public registries.  
Fourth, the Global Forum has to potential of addressing a number of other crucial 
issues. Namely, it has to ensure that sanctions for non-compliance with the 
reporting obligations are not capped and include prison terms for wilful 
misreporting. And most importantly, it has the power to require detailed, yet 
aggregate public statistics about the information reporting on a country by 
country basis. That would enable robust evaluation of the quality of the 
information reporting, and build the confidence by the public and societies 
around the world that offshore tax evasion is not condoned any longer.  
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